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DICTA

REACHING FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES
AND EQUITABLE INTERESTS OF DEBTORS*
WORTH ALLEN
of the Denver Bar

The equitable rights and remedies of creditors which will be
dealt with in this paper relate to two different types of property
interests of the debtor: (1) property which has been fraudulently 1
conveyed by debtors, and (2) equitable interests which debtors may
have in property.
The existence of a creditor's interest in the first class is established by a section of the Colorado statutes 2 which provides that
every conveyance of real estate, goods, things in action, rents, profits, etc., made with intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors or
other persons, as against the person hindered, delayed or defrauded,
"shall be void". The conveyances referred to in the statute are,
obviously, those made by debtors. It should be noted that the3
statute in terms applies to personal property as well as real estate.
However, while much that is said in the cases applies with equal
force to conveyances of real and personal property, this brief
article will be confined to real estate. It may be pointed out in passing that while there is no difference in principle between cases involving personal and real property, the duration of a statutory
lien on personal property is much shorter than that on real property, and the statute relating to lis pendens does not apply to personal property.
In the second class of cases in which creditors seek to realize
their claims out of equitable interests of the debtors, the statute
relating to fraudulent conveyances is not involved. To illustrate the
nature of the equitable interests involved in this class of cases, we
may suppose that a debtor buys property, furnishing the consideration himself, and to conceal the property from his creditors, he
directs the grantor to convey to the debtor's wife or some other
person. Another type of case which comes under this second class
arises when the property is conveyed by the debtor himself to the
third party at a time when he was not involved financially and
when he could not have had any fraudulent intent. At any rate, in
such a case, the valid legal title is in a third person, and the debtor
* This is an adaptation of the second paper presented at the Denver Bar Association's institute on creditors' rights, January 24, 1950.

1 The words, fraud, fraudulent, fraudulently, are used herein to refer to cases
including those

where possibly

no actual fraud was intended, but where the intent,

however well-meant, was to hinder and delay.
2 COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 71, § 17 (1935).
3 This is a modification of the English statute against fraudulent conveyances, 13
Eliz. c. 5, which, by the decision of Sir Edward Coke in Twyne's Case, 3 Coke, 80 b,
5 Eng. Rul. Cas. 2, was judicially determined to include conveyances
erty.

of personal prop-
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has only the equitable title. Such title may be based on the intent
of the parties, or the trust may be a constructive one imposed by
law.
NECESSARY PRELIMINARY STEPS

What steps are or have been necessary to reach the two classes
of property? Without an understanding of the sound ratio decidendi, lawyers are left in hopeless confusion after reading the
cases in which the courts themselves obviously have been confused.
Despite this apparent confusion in these recent cases, the results
seem to be proper.
The rule in both classes of cases has been that the general
creditor must have a judgment against the debtor before he can
secure relief against the latter in equity. While the reason for the
rule consistently has been stated to be "that resort cannot be had
to equity where there is an adequate remedy at law", underlying
the rule and stated reason therefor is the zealously guarded right
of trial by jury. It has been correctly stated that "the real basis
of the rule that a judgment at law is a condition precedent to
affirmative equitable relief on behalf of a creditor is, therefore,
that the debtor has the right to have the issue of indebtedness determined by jury." 4
The rule requiring judgment before granting negative relief,
which is the tying-up of the debtor's property before judgment has
been obtained against him, is based upon consideration for the
debtor. The courts concluded that it was better to leave the debtor
free to deal with his property, although he may put it out of reach
of his creditors before they obtain a judgment against him, than
possibly to permit some unscrupulous creditor to keep the struggling debtor from honestly attempting to meet his obligations.
The great confusion has arisen in considering what further
steps, if any, must be taken in the two classes of cases before resorting to equity. Under the original English statute against fraudulent conveyances and similar statutes of the states, property fraudulently conveyed by the debtor is subject to execution. Property to
which the debtor had only equitable title was not at common law or
under early statutes subject to execution. The theory under which
relief is granted against property subject to execution is entirely
different from the theory under which aid is extended to reach
property not subject to execution. It is obvious from the decisions
that the confusion of ideas is caused primarily by overlooking
the basis on which jurisdiction rests, and by the presumption
that the necessary steps, which are conditions precedent to relief in all instances where the creditor is attempting to obtain
property not subject to execution, are also necessary where he is
pursuing property which is subject to execution.
4 See Note, 23 L.R.A. (N.S.)
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WHERE THE PROPERTY IS SUBJECT TO EXECUTION

As to property subject to execution, the judgment creditor was
required to take steps to secure a lien upon the property fraudulently conveyed. The lien attaches to real estate in Colorado upon
the filing with the recorder of a certified transcript of the judgment
docket entry. 5 Thereupon the judgment creditor went into equity
and stated that the transfer was fraudulent and that his lien was
clouded and obstructed by the fraudulent transfer. He alleged that
his lien was to no avail under the present circumstances and asked
that the court clear-up the title, so as to enable him to enforce the
holding of the court of law and allow him to make an advantageous
sale of the property in question.
The lien was all that was required. The rule as to exhaustion
of the remedy at law had no application here. As a matter of fact,
one could not properly have made a return nulla bona, for the obvious reason that the property fraudulently conveyed could be
levied upon and sold, the fraudulent conveyance being void. But,
even when this property is levied upon and sold, we are still unable
to make an advantageous sale because no determination by a decree as to whether the conveyance was fraudulent had been made.
Relief at law being inadequate in such a situation, equity took
jurisdiction.
WHERE EQUITABLE TITLE IS IN THE DEBTOR

When relief was sought in the second class of cases, wherein
the judgment creditor sought to reach equitable title, no levy of
execution could be made until authorized by comparatively recent statutes. The creditor had no lien which he could ask equity
to clear. In this class of cases, as distinguished from the class involving property fraudulently conveyed by the debtor, the creditor
was required to exhaust his remedy at law by showing that the
debtor had no other property which might be reached by ordinary
legal remedies.6 Thus, in cases of this type, we have the requirement of a return nulla bona,such a return being merely proof that
there was no other property out of which the creditor's judgment
could be collected.
This fundamental distinction between the two classes of cases,
and the different conditions precedent for equitable relief in each
class, is set forth in the opinion of our Supreme Court in the case
of Chalupav. Preston,7 wherein the court quoted at length from the
very clear and sound opinion written by Judge Sanborn in Schofield
v. Ute Coal & Coke Co.,8 a case appealed from the United States
Circuit Court for the District of Colorado.
In our Colorado statutes we find the provision that from the
time of filing the transcript, the judgment becomes a lien upon "all
'COLO.

STAT. ANN.,

c. 93, § 2 (1935).

'Emery v. Yount, 7 Colo. 107, 1 P. 686 (1883).
,65 Colo. 400, 177 P. 965 (1918).
'92 F. 269 (1899).
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the real property of such judgment debtor-". 9 Nothing is said as
to whether the interest to which the lien attaches may be an equitable one, although a subsequent section of this same chapter provides for levy upon every interest in land, legal and equitable. 10
It has been held by our Supreme Court,1 ' that a judgment, upon the
filing of the transcript, becomes a lien upon an equitable interest in
land. It would seem, therefore, that from the time the two statutory
provisions just referred to became effective, the second class of
cases involving the reaching of equitable interests in land became
subject to the same rules as the first class of cases in which the
legal title remained in the judgment debtor in spite of his fraudulent conveyance. As a result of this, the supreme court held that
no return nulla bona is required as a condition precedent to reaching the equitable interests of the judgment debtor in real estate,
after the judgment creditor has secured a lien by filing the transcript. In holding this to be the law, our Colorado courts have stated
that the levy of an execution upon a lien could not make it more
specific or more efficient. The learned justices seemed to feel that
the conclusion is irresistible that the general lien upon the real
estate created by entering a judgment or filing a transcript of it
in the county where the lands of the debtor are situated, in accordance with the statutes which provide therefor, is a sufficient basis
for the maintenance of a suit in equity to2 remove a fraudulent
obstruction to the enforcement of that lien.'
Space will not permit the consideration of many other questions involved in a creditor's suit or in a suit in the nature of creditor's suit.' 3 They cause no particular difficulty. I might point out
that in exceptional cases it has been held unnecessary to procure a
judgment against the debtor before seeking equitable relief. For instance, it was held that when the judgment debtor is a non-resident,
a money judgment is not essential and that a lien4 might be obtained
by a creditor's suit with a notice of lis pendens.'
In passing, it may be pointed out that even though a debtor
conveys property to a creditor with intent to defraud or to hinder
and delay one or more other creditors, the conveyance is good if
the grantee did not participate in the known intent of the grantor,
but took the conveyance solely to secure payment of his own claim.
Knowledge on the part of the creditor receiving the property that
the debtor has acted with fraudulent intention is immaterial if the
creditor has not done anything except receive payment of his claim.
It is obvious that a creditor of an insolvent debtor must stop at
securing his debt. If he goes further than this and actively participates or assists in any way in the carrying out of the fraudulent
9COIO. STAT. ANN.,

C. 93,

§ 2 (1935).

Id., § 6.
Stephens v. Parvn, 33 Colo. 60, 78 P. 688 (1904).
Stephens v. Paxvin, 33 Colo. 60, 78 Pac. 688 (1904).
13 We need not dwell on the fact that a creditor's suit is one in which equitable
title is sought to be reached, and that a suit for relief with respect to property fraudulently
1 4 conveyed is one in the nature of a creditor's suit.
Shuck v. Quackenbush, 75 Colo. 592, 227 P. 1041 (1924).
1
12
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purpose, his preference so obtained will be avoided in favor of other
creditors. The motives which may have influenced the debtor to
prefer one creditor over the others are of no importance if the
preferred creditor has done nothing improper to secure the transfer.
THE EFFECT OF RULE

18 (b)

The consideration shown by the courts for those alleged to be
debtors, by leaving their property free from any lien or cloud until
a money judgment had been obtained, was abandoned by the adoption of Rule 18 (b) of our Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:
(b)
Joinder of Remedies; Fraudulent Conveyances. Whenever
a claim is one heretofore cognizable only after another claim has
been prosecuted to a conclusion, the two claims may be joined in a
single action; but the court shall grant relief in that action only in
accordance with the relative substantive rights of the parties. In
particular, a plaintiff may state a claim for money and a claim to
have set aside a conveyance fraudulent as to him, without first
having obtained a judgment establishing the claim for money.

The result is that now the creditor may bring. suit to recover
a judgment and, in the same action, secure a decree declaring a conveyance void as being fraudulent. By filing a notice of lis pendens,
the debtor's property is held for an appropriate equitable decree
with respect thereto, if a money judgment is obtained and the conveyance is held to be fraudulent.
No case has been found under said rule, or under the identical
Federal Rule 18 (b), in which a creditor has sought a money judgment and a decree respecting the debtor's equitable title in real
estate. However, the first sentence of the rule obviously is broad
enough to include such a case. The second sentence of the rule in
referring to a fraudulent conveyance "in particular" must be regarded as providing an illustration or as saying that the general
in the first sentence includes the case set forth in the
rule found
15
second.
In a Federal case, 16 the modus operandi in the trial of a case
brought under said rule was stated as follows:
...I rule that all issues which are common to the legal causes
of action (in either count) and to the equitable cause stated in the
second count shall be tried together, the legal issues, of course, to
the jury and the equitable issues to the court; and that all equitable
issues which do not pertain to the legal causes shall be tried to the
court immediately following the jury trial.
This ruling will have practical application as follows: On the
day of trial . . . the parties will proceed precisely as though trying
to the jury both the first count and the second count viewed as
charging actionable fraud, and the rulings on the evidence will be
made as though no other issues were before the court. The court,
however, will accept all evidence which is feceived in the jury trial
for any proper bearing it may have upon the second count viewed
1Greeley
10 Ford v.

Transportation Co. v. The People, 79 Colo. 307, 245 P. 720 (1926).
C. E. Wilson Co., Inc., 30 F. Supp. 163, 165-66 (1939).
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as a cause of action in equity. After the jury has been charged and
has retired to deliberate, the court will proceed to hear additional
evidence on the equitable cause stated in the second count. There
will be neither need nor permission to reiterate evidence already
received in the jury trial; but any evidence theretofore offered and
excluded in the jury trial may again be offered for its bearing on
the second count viewed as a cause of action in equity.

Thus it is apparent that many of the old problems arising from
questions pertaining to equitable rights and the remedies of creditors have been greatly simplified by the adoption of Rule 18 (b).

Book Notices
LABOR RELATIONS LAW, by Marcus Manoff of the Massachusetts and Pennsylvania Bars. 1950. $2.00. 140 pages.
A series of basic texts on important subjects of the law is
being published by the Committee on Continuing Legal Education
of the American Law Institute collaborating with the American
Bar Association. This pamphlet is another in that series.
There has long been a need to the average general practitioner, not particularly skilled in the subject, for a basic text on
the subject of labor relations law. Most general practitioners who
represent business clients have need for at least some knowledge
of this important subject. With such knowledge, they can solve
many of the problems confronting them without the necessity of
turning them over to a specialist. Also, with such a basic knowledge they can gradually undertake the responsibility of the more
complicated labor problems of their clients. This book fills that
need. It covers the substantive aspects of labor law and combines
with this insights into practical problems. It is a general orientation booklet and a guide to substantive and procedural matters
constantly confronting the business client.
PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT, by Cyrus Austin of
the New York Bar. 1950. $2.00. 163 pages.
The Robinson-Patman Act is of prime importance to every
businessman whose business crosses state lines. Therefore, every
lawyer representing such clients should know something about
the act. Unfortunately, few do. This is no mere handbook. It is
a concise but comprehensive treatise, covering in one compact
volume all of the subsections of the act. Each is analyzed in turn
and all important questions of construction and compliance which
have arisen and which are apt to arise are treated. The RobinsonPatman Act is not of importance alone to lawyers who must advise
clients engaged in selling goods as to how to cqnform their pricing
practices to the act's requirements. This book will be found valuable for reference in determining the rights and responsibilities
of buyers as well.

